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Abstract
Standard real business cycle theory predicts that consumption should be smoother than out-
put, as observed in developed countries. In emerging economies, however, consumption is more
volatile than income. In this paper we provide a novel explanation of this phenomenon, the
`consumption volatility puzzle', based on political frictions. We develop a dynamic stochastic
political economy model where parties that disagree on the size of government (right-wing and
left-wing) alternate in power and face aggregate uncertainty. While productivity shocks aect
only consumption through responses to output, political shocks (switches in political ideology)
change the composition between private and public consumption for a given output size via
changes in the level of taxes. Since emerging economies are characterized by less stable govern-
ments and more polarized societies, the eects of political shocks are more pronounced. For a
reasonable set of parameters we conrm the empirical relationship between political polarization
and the ratio of consumption volatility to output volatility across countries.
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11 Introduction
Standard real business cycle theory predicts that consumption should be smoother than output.
Agents focus on permanent rather than temporary income when making decisions, so they react
to an increase in income by saving part of it for future consumption. This prediction holds for
developed countries, where the volatility of consumption is in general smaller than the volatility of
output. In emerging economies, however, consumption is more volatile than income (23% at annual
frequencies and 40% at quarterly frequencies), a phenomenon known as the `consumption volatility
puzzle'. In this paper we explore whether the introduction of political frictions into a standard real
business cycle model can qualitatively and quantitatively explain this puzzle.
We are motivated by three observations drawn from analyzing stylized facts in emerging versus
developed economies. First, there is a positive correlation between the variability of private and
public consumption. Second, the relative volatility of consumption is positively correlated with
the degree of political polarization (the dispersion in political preferences among the population).
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Figure 1: Relative volatility of consumption and polarization.
Our main hypothesis is that 
uctuations in economic variables are not only caused by innova-
tions to productivity but also by shifts in ideology regarding the size of government. Countries that
are more polarized exhibit larger swings in the level of spending. Because consumption responds
more than output to the resulting changes in taxation, these countries will tend to have a larger
relative volatility of consumption. We elaborate on this argument in a dynamic political economy
model and provide intuition by looking at an example economy for which analytical solutions can
2be computed. We then calibrate the more general environment to a set of emerging and developed
economies in order to quantify how much of the variability in relative consumption volatility can
be explained by the model by varying its degree of political polarization.
Our setup embeds Persson and Svensson's (1989) political economy model of public goods
provision in a neoclassical growth framework. Political parties that disagree on the size of the
government alternate in power. Left-wing parties place more weight on public spending than
right-wing parties and hence tax income at a higher rate in order to nance a larger level of
expenditures. This introduces an additional source of volatility for economic variables triggered by
changes in government policy, which can be interpreted as political shocks. In contrast to total factor
productivity (TFP) shocks, a political shock aects consumption immediately through changes in
agents' disposable income, while the response of output (caused by changes in investment) is delayed
and muted. As a result, consumption volatility can be larger than output volatility in the presence
of political shocks. Our mechanism is related to the earlier work of Dotsey (1990) and Baxter and
King (1993) who study the eects of exogenous government expenditure shocks on macroeconomic
activity. A main departure is that public policy is endogenous in our model. We are able to
generate the stylized fact that government spending is more volatile in emerging economies than in
developed ones (the average volatility is three times as large, as shown in Table 1) and to provide
a reasonable channel by which this happens.1
We endogenize public spending by building on a growing literature on political macroeco-
nomics. There are two important frictions borrowed from this literature|in addition to political
disagreement|relative to a standard neoclassical economy that are key to our results. The rst
is that the policymaker lacks commitment. Ineciencies are introduced because neither party can
credibly commit to follow a particular sequence of taxes and spending. This relates to the theories
of political failure presented by Persson and Svensson (1989) and Besley and Coate (1998) in two-
period models. We focus instead on an innite horizon economy and characterize time-consistent
outcomes as Markov-perfect equilibria following Klein, Krusell and Rios-Rull (2008).
The second friction results from the outcome of future elections being uncertain at the time
policy choices are taken, together with market incompleteness, since a set of contingent claims that
allow the current policymaker to insure against shocks does not exist. This generates additional
ineciencies because the incumbent party is more short-sighted than its constituency when subject
to political uncertainty. This was rst pointed out by Alesina and Tabellini (1990) and more
recently studied in fully dynamic models by Aguiar and Amador (2010) and Azzimonti (2010).2
While their environment is completely symmetric, the ideology of the policymaker may change
over time, so we analyze equilibria where policy functions are asymmetric. Persson and Svensson
(1989) and Cukierman, Edwards and Tabellini (1992) study asymmetric equilibria, but in two-
period deterministic models where the emphasis is on manipulation of government policy. In our
environment the incumbent party also has incentives to use policy strategically because changes in
the tax level, by aecting individual savings, modify the tax base inherited by its successor. The
1Woo (2005) also relies on political shocks of the sort studied here to generate large levels of public consumption
volatility, but by assuming that policymakers only care about public goods.
2Similar eects have been studied in environments with debt instead of capital by Amador (2008), Caballero and
Yared (2008), Devereux and Wen (1998), and Ilzetzki (2010).
3interaction of these two frictions gives rise to politically driven business cycles. This is related to an
earlier paper on partisan cycles by Alesina (1987). While he focuses on disagreement over in
ation
and unemployment, our focus is on the eect of public spending and taxation on real macroeconomic
variables.3 In addition to the endogenous partisan business cycle driven by asymmetric policy, we
introduce aggregate shocks to productivity in the tradition of the macroeconomics literature which
is absent in most of the political economy work. An exception is Barseghyan, Battaglini and Coate
(2010), who study scal policy over the business cycle in a non standard neoclassical environment.
Because they abstract from capital and agents are risk neutral, their model is silent on the eects
of these policies on consumption volatility. An important methodological contribution of our work
is thus the implementation of global numerical methods to compute stochastic politico-economic
equilibria in a neoclassical environment. To the best of our knowledge this has not been done in
the past.
This paper also complements two strands of literature that have tried to account for the con-
sumption volatility puzzle. The rst one focuses on stochastic productivity trends and is based on
the permanent income hypothesis. The idea is that the volatility of permanent income dominates
the volatility of transitory shocks to income in emerging economies, as postulated by Aguiar and
Gopinath (2007) and studied by Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe (2011). A second explanation relies on
the existence of nancial frictions and is based on the nancing of a rm's working capital. For
example, in Neumeyer and Perri (2005) current interest rate shocks aect labor (and hence out-
put) with a lag, while private savings (and hence consumption) adjust immediately. This creates a
larger overall response of consumption to shocks (see also Fern andez-Villaverde, Guerr on, Rubio-
Ram rez, and Uribe [2009] for more recent work). The emphasis in these models is on real shocks
to the economy, either through TFP (transitory vs. permanent) or interest rates. In this paper we
propose a novel explanation for the puzzle based on ideological swings of policymakers, which can
be interpreted as political shocks.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes a set of stylized facts that characterize
the business cycle properties of emerging and developed economies for a panel of countries. The
main assumptions of the model are summarized in Section 3, where the stochastic politico-economic
equilibrium is dened. Intuition on how this model helps explain the puzzle is provided in Section 4,
where we nd tractable analytical expressions and decompose the volatility of consumption between
TFP and political shocks. We calibrate the model to the US economy in Section 5 and perform
our main experiment by varying the degree of political polarization across countries in Section 5.2.
The main business cycle moments for our articial economy are computed and contrasted with the
ones analyzed in Section 2. Conclusions and extensions are contained in Section 6. All proofs are
relegated to the Appendix.
2 Stylized Facts
In this section we present business cycle properties of a broad set of countries and point to some key
dierences between emerging and developed economies. The countries under study are summarized
3Milesi-Ferretti and Spolaore (1994) and more recently Song (2010) study the eect of strategic manipulation on
partisan cycles. See Drazen (2000) for a comprehensive review of data and theory.
4in Table 7, Appendix 7.1. Following Aguiar and Gopinath (2007), we use the S&P classication
for developed markets for our developed economies and classify all other countries as emerging.4
The data are obtained from Kaminsky, Reinhart, and V egh (2004) who compile a comprehen-
sive cross-country panel for our main variables of interest from the IMF World Economic Outlook
(WEO) and IMF Government Financial Statistics (GFS) data sets. We compute business cycle mo-
ments (volatilities, autocorrelations and correlations) on Hodrick-Prescott ltered (with smoothing
parameter 100) natural logs of each (GDP de
ated) variable on the available time series for each
country. Since data availability is not consistent across the four variables for individual countries,
the period studied in each case re
ects the longest time span for which we have complete data for
that country. Sample lengths for each country are reported in Table 7, Appendix 7.1.
Table 1: Business cycle moments (averages)










Note: This table contains the average value of moments computed for a set
of emerging and developed economies. Relative volatility measures for each
country can be found in Table 8 in Appendix 7.1. Data are obtained from
Kaminsky, Reinhart and Vegh (2004).
Output in emerging economies is about twice as volatile as output in developed economies with
roughly the same autocorrelation. This has previously been documented by Aguiar and Gopinath
(2007) for quarterly data in a smaller sample of countries. They also pointed to the striking
dierence in the volatility of consumption relative to output between the two groups. Consumption
is less volatile than output for developed economies but 23% more volatile than income in our sample
for emerging economies. There are some exceptions, as can be seen in the rst column of Table 8
in Appendix 7.1, which reports the individual values for each country. Much of the focus on cross-
country dierences in the business cycle properties of government expenditure has centered on the
dierence in the volatility of government consumption in developed versus emerging economies (see
Bachman and Bai [2010] for an analysis of the US economy or Lane [2003] for a comparison across
OECD countries). Consistent with this literature, we nd that public consumption is much more
volatile both absolutely and relative to output volatility in emerging economies. We nd that at
4Two primary criteria used in dening a country as a developed market are (i) it is located in a high-income
country as dened by the World Bank and (ii) its capital markets are highly developed and transparent with large
market capitalization.
5business cycle frequencies it is more volatile than output by a factor of three, more than double
that for developed economies. We also nd support for the pro-cyclicality of public spending both
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Figure 2: Relative volatility of public and private consumption.
Part of the motivation for our analysis comes from the correlation of government expenditure
volatility to consumption volatility. Figure 2 shows that countries with large observed relative
volatility of private consumption also tend to have more volatile public expenditure. The correlation
of these variables is 0.24. This relationship is important because increases in polarization in the
model aect the degree of volatility for both, a channel explored further in succeeding sections.
A line of empirical research has studied the eects of the variability of shocks to government
expenditures on macroeconomic outcomes. Fat as and Mihov (2003) estimate that for every percent
increase in volatility of output driven by volatility of scal policy reduces growth by 0.75 percentage
point.
The observation that the relative volatility of investment is roughly the same for developed
and emerging economies is consistent with ndings in the literature. Given the wide dierences
in consumption and public spending volatilities, this suggests the presence of adjustment costs to
investment.
Empirical studies using polarization oer reassuring but ultimately unsatisfying support for
our hypothesis that polarization matters for economic stability. Starting with Easterly and Levine
5Ilzetzki [2010] and Ilzetzki and V egh (2008) document that government expenditure is pro-cyclical in emerging
economies and weakly counter cyclical in developed economies. The cyclicality of government expenditure depends
largely on transfers, which we do not directly model, so we focus on the series of public consumption rather than on
total public expenditures. Ideally, we would want to present business cycle moments of government expenditures net
of transfers, but unfortunately data on transfers are not available for most emerging economies. We do have data for
the US and Mexico, which will be used in the model's calibration.
6(1997) a large literature has developed attributing economic outcomes to ideological dierences in
the population. However, most of these papers use non partisan heterogeneity in the population; for
example, employing ethnic, religious, and linguistic divisions as their polarization measures deliver
negative outcomes.6 Closer to our partisan model Alt and Dreyer Lassen (2000) and Lindqvist
and  Ostling (2007) empirically link political polarization to economic performance using dierent
and more relevant measures of partisan disagreement over the size of government. We adopt the
measure from Lindqvist and  Ostling directly. They use self-reported political preferences from
the 1999-2002 World Values Survey (a description of their method can be found in Appendix 7.1).
Importantly, they nd that political polarization is not endogenous to economic performance, in line
with our model assumption. Using this measure, we nd the motivating stylized facts mentioned
in the introduction, that the relative volatility of both government expenditure and consumption
are positively related to polarization and emerging economies, display higher levels of polarization,
as shown above in Figure 1.
3 Environment
Our setup embeds Persson and Svensson's (1989) political economy model of public goods provision
in a neoclassical growth framework.
3.1 Economic environment
Technology is characterized by a Cobb-Douglas production function that uses capital k and labor
l to produce a single consumption good
F(z;k;l) = ezkl1 :
The variable z represents an aggregate productivity shock that follows an AR(1) process
z0 = z + 0
where  is a draw from an iid normal distribution and jj < 1. Capital depreciates at rate  and








as modeled by Greenwood, Hercowitz and Krusell (2000).
There is also a public good, denoted by g, that can be produced from the consumption good
according to a linear technology. We normalize the time endowment in the economy to 1. Thus,
the aggregate resource constraint reads
c + g + k0 = F(z;k;1) + (1   )k   (k;k0):
6Alesina and Zhuravskaya (2008) provide a recent novel measure of population heterogeneity and its eect on the
quality of government
7There are competitive labor and capital markets and competitive production of public goods.
The relative price of private and public goods is one in equilibrium. The wage rate is denoted by w
and the rental rate of capital by r. Firms hire labor and capital in order to maximize prots after
observing their productivity shock. Their decision problem is static and deterministic, implying
w = Fl(z;k;l) and r = Fk(z;k;l): (1)
Citizens live forever and discount the future at rate  < 1. They derive utility from the
consumption of private and public goods. Political disagreement arises from heterogeneity in agents'
preferences regarding the overall size of the government. We assume that there are two types
indexed by i, with i 2 fL;Rg.
The instantaneous utility of a type i agent is separable in private and public consumption
(1   i)u(c) + iv(g)
where u and v are increasing and concave, and the weights on public consumption satisfy L =  +
and R =     . Since R < L, we can think of R as right-wing (small government) and L
as left-wing (large government) individuals. The variance of i is determined by , which can
be interpreted as a measure of the degree of political polarization in society. If  was equal to
zero, agents would be completely homogeneous. As  increases, views regarding the provision
of g become more con
icting. This parameter will be the key variable governing the volatility of
government distortions in cross-country comparisons. Complementarity between private and public
consumption would induce a direct co-movement between the two goods and additional volatility
in consumption. By assuming separability, we are reducing this degree of freedom.
Citizens nance private consumption and investment with capital and labor income, which are
taxed at the proportional rate 
ci = (1   )[wli + rki + (1   )k]   k0
i   (k;k0):
Since leisure is not valued, the supply of labor is inelastic. The choice of investment k0
i is inter-
temporal and depends on government policy. While the current level of taxes  is known at the
time of decision-making, citizens need to form expectations about future policy 0. We postpone a
description about how these expectations are formed until the next section. Note that because all
agents face the same policy and preferences are additively separable, investment decisions are inde-
pendent of type. As a result we can focus the analysis on a representative agent that accumulates
capital according to a standard Euler equation with adjustment costs
uc(c)(1 + k0(k;k0)) = E

[(1   0)(r0 + 1   )   k(k0;k00)]uc(c0)

:
The government is subject to a period-by-period balanced budget constraint
f(z;k) = g;
where we simplify the notation by dening f(z;k)  F(z;k;1).
83.2 Political environment
There are two political parties L and R representing each group in the population. The incumbent
party is chosen at the beginning of a period and sets policy in order to maximize the utility of
its constituency. Agents and rms then choose allocations taking as given current policy and
expectations of future policy. Parties alternate in power following an exogenous Markov process,
where p denotes the type-independent probability of retaining oce in the next period. Despite
the fact that there are two symmetric parties, the re-election probability may be larger than 0:5
due to incumbency advantage eects. The micro-foundations of this specication come from a
probabilistic voting model as shown in Azzimonti (2010).
A key feature of the environment is the government's lack of commitment; tax and spending
policy promises are not credible unless they are ex-post ecient. The party in power plays a game
against the opposition, taking their policy as given. Alternate realizations of history (dened by
the sequence of policies and realizations of productivity shocks up to time t) may result in dierent
current policies. In principle, this dynamic game allows for multiple subgame perfect equilibria
that can be constructed using reputation mechanisms. We will rule out such mechanisms and focus
instead on Markov perfect equilibria (MPE), dened as a set of strategies that depend only on the
current payo-relevant states of the economy: k and z. Because parties have dierent objectives,
their policy choices dier in equilibrium, so strategies are functions of their type.
The two key equilibrium objects are the spending rule of incumbent i, Gi(z;k) and the invest-
ment decision of our representative citizen Hi(z;k). Note that the latter is a function of the identity
of the party in power due to the eect of tax policies on savings behavior. The tax rule Ti(z;k) is
trivially determined from the government's budget constraint. The value function of a citizen type
i when his group is in power will be denoted by Vi(z;k) and when his group is out of power by
Wi(z;k).
3.3 Political equilibrium
An incumbent party chooses the provision of public good g knowing that it might be replaced by a
dierent policymaker with probability p. Suppose that a left-wing government L is elected. Given
the stock of public capital k and the current realization of the shock z, the incumbent's objective
function today is given by
max
g (1   L)u(c) + Lv(g) + Ez[pVL(z0;k0) + (1   p)WL(z0;k0)]
where the consumption of its constituency satises
c = f(z;k) + (1   )k   g   k0   (k;k0)  C(z;k;k0;g):
Private savings k0 given current spending g satises the Euler equation
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(2)




F(z0;k0) . Expectations EzL are taken with respect to productivity z0 and political shocks j
(i.e., the identity of tomorrow's incumbent), given that L is currently in power and the current
realization of TFP is z.
The functional equation (2) determines future capital as a function of current capital, productiv-
ity, and public spending, k0 = HL(z;k;g). It summarizes an agent's optimal reaction to a one-period
deviation of g from the equilibrium rule that an incumbent would follow in the Markov-perfect equi-
librium, GL(z;k). Agents expect tomorrow's incumbent of type j to follow the equilibrium strategy
g0
j = Gj(z0;k0), and capital to satisfy k00 = Hj(z0;k0) under such policy. Consistency requires that
Hi(z;k) = Hi(z;k;Gi(z;k)) for all i.
The description of the problem is completed by dening the functions VL(z;k) and WL(z;k):
VL(z;k) = (1   L)u(CL(z;k)) + Lv (GL(z;k)) + Ez[pVL(z0;k0) + (1   p)WL(z0;k0)] (3)
and
WL(z;k) = (1   L)u(CR(z;k)) + Lv (GR(z;k)) + Ez[(1   p)VL(z0;k0) + pWL(z0;k0)] (4)
where Ci(z;k) = C(z;k;Hi(z;k);Gi(z;k)). The main dierence between equations (3) and (4)
is that spending levels in the second equation are chosen by a right-wing party and hence do not
maximize the objective of incumbent L. A second dierence comes from the expectation over
political shocks since p denotes the probability of retaining power for a given incumbent.
The political uncertainty, combined with the con
ict over the provision of public goods, cre-
ates incentives to act strategically. This becomes clear when analyzing incumbent L's rst order
condition,
(1   L)uc( 1   Hg(1 + k0)) + Lvg + Ez[pV 0
k;L + (1   p)W0
k;L]Hg = 0:
When choosing g, the decision maker trades o the current benet of larger government expendi-
tures given by the increase in v(g) to the current cost of nancing this increase via taxes, which
lowers today's consumption c. In addition, it takes into account the dynamic eects of this policy
change, since larger taxes reduce current savings by Hg. This aects continuation utilities V and
W directly by reducing future income and indirectly by lowering future spending of incumbent j.
By controlling the level of investment|via changes in the tax system|an incumbent party can
aect the spending level of future policymakers through changes to tomorrow's tax base. This form
of manipulation has been extensively studied in the political economy literature in the context of
optimal debt management pioneered by Persson and Svensson (1989), but received less attention
in economies where private rather than public savings are aected.
Denition 3.1 (MPE) A Markov-perfect equilibrium satises
i. Given current policy and expectations on future policy, agent's and rm's decisions are a
competitive equilibrium.
10ii. Given equilibrium allocations and expectations on future policy, current policy solves incum-
bent i's problem.
iii. The incumbent party's choices are consistent with private expectations,
g = Gi(z;k):
This denition imposes consistency between citizens' and government's decisions. Additionally it
implies that private expectations are correct and no incumbent has incentive to deviate from the
MPE. A theoretical characterization of the MPE is non trivial in general, but under some restrictive
assumptions on the primitives of the economy it is possible to nd an analytical characterization.
This will allow us to shed some light on how the main mechanism driving the volatility of output,
consumption and expenditures operates in this environment.
4 Example Economy
Political shocks aect economic variables dierently than standard innovations to productivity. In
particular, consumption reacts instantaneously to a political shock while output changes with a
one-period lag. Keeping TFP constant, this results in consumption volatility being larger than
output volatility. To illustrate this further it is useful to analyze an example economy.
Assumption 4.1 Suppose that (i) preferences over private and public consumption, u and v, are
logarithmic, (ii) productivity innovations follow a 2-state Markov process: zs with s 2 fH;Lg, (iii)
there is full depreciation  = 1 and (iv) there are no adjustment costs  = 0.
Under these assumptions we can show that private investment is proportional to output yz =
ezk and decreasing in public spending, H(z;k;g) = yz   g. Because private consumption is
also linear in output, we guess that government spending follows a linear and type-dependent rule.
This guess is veried in the following proposition.
Proposition 4.1 Under Assumption 1, the MPE satises
Gi(z;k) = iezk; Hi(z;k) = (1   i)ezk; and
Ci(z;k) = (1   )(1   i)ezk where  =
1   2p   22(1   2p)
1 + (1   2p)
:
Proof 4.1 See Appendix 7.3
The marginal propensity of right-wing governments to spend on public goods R is smaller
than that of left-wing incumbents. The model thus predicts a smaller size of the government under
an R incumbent party and a lower tax burden on the private sector. Since disposable income is
larger, individuals choose higher consumption and investment than when a left-wing party is in
power. This has interesting implications regarding the underlying dynamics of the model.
114.1 Long-run dynamics
To make the exposition simpler, ignore TFP shocks for the moment, focusing only on the political
dimension. Figure 3 depicts private investment as a function of the current stock of capital. Keeping
z = zH, the line HL(zH;k) represents tomorrow's value of capital assuming that L is currently in
power. If there was no political turnover (that is, L was in power forever) capital would eventually
converge to k
LH. If instead a right-wing party was in power forever, steady state capital, k
RH,
would be larger. Moreover, the speed of convergence for a given value of z, dened as

iz = (1   i)ezk 1;
is higher under i = R. That is, growth is faster and the economy converges to a larger steady state
level of capital under governments that have a smaller weight on public consumption. The intuition
relies on the fact that a left-wing party prefers a larger share of output to be devoted to public goods
provision. Because nancing this good is costly under proportional taxation, ineciencies are more
pronounced than under an R-type government and have long-term distortionary consequences in
the economy.
Figure 3: Evolution of capital
4.2 Short-run dynamics
Now consider the response of the economy to a political shock, starting from the steady state
attained under a left-wing government. Suppose that party R gains power for only one period and
L regains control of the government forever after. The impulse-response function of consumption
and output is depicted in Panel A of Figure 4. The main dierence in both variables lies in the
timing of responses: Consumption reacts immediately, while output only jumps upward with a
12Figure 4: Impulse response to productivity and political shocks ({ consumption and - output)
one-period lag. The reason is the following: The switch in political ideology generates a reduction
in public spending and taxes, which triggers an increase in current consumption. Output remains
unchanged due to the fact that capital is given and labor is inelastic. Individuals also increase
investment in response to the change in regime, since lower taxes behave similarly to a positive
income shock. The larger stock of capital in the second period increases production at that point.
As time goes by the eects of the shock dissipate slowly until the economy converges to the original
steady state.
A positive TFP shock has the same eects on economic variables as those found in a stan-
dard real business cycle (RBC) model. In particular, current output increases immediately as the
economy becomes more productive. The positive income eect induces a concurrent increase in
consumption, which individuals smooth out over time by also raising investment. Under logarith-
mic utility it turns out that a 1% increase in output results in exactly 1% rise in consumption. This
can be seen clearly in Panel C of Figure 4 where the size of the response to the shock coincides for
both variables.
The previous discussion makes it clear that while both positive TFP shocks (increases in z) and
political shocks (power switches from L to R) increase agents' disposable income, they have very
dierent implications for output dynamics. An immediate testable implication of the model is that
13consumption boosts that are observed leading GDP booms are associated to changes in ideological
views of the government (i.e., on government spending), rather than innovations in productivity.
Traditional TFP shocks result in coincidental movements in private consumption instead.
Proposition 4.2 presents a decomposition of the volatility of consumption due to each type of
shock.
Proposition 4.2 Suppose that p > 0:5. Let ^ ct = lnct, ^ yt = lnyt, and ^ xt = ln(1   i), then the
variance of (log) consumption satises
V ar(^ ct) = V ar(^ yt) + V ar(^ xt) + 2Cov(^ yt; ^ xt) (5)
where Cov(^ yt; ^ xt) =
Pt
k=1 k0:52(2p   1)k(^ xL   ^ xR)2.
This proposition illustrates the consumption volatility puzzle that arises under the lens of
a traditional neoclassical framework. Because political shocks are abstracted from V ar(^ xt) =
Cov(^ yt; ^ xt) = 0, so consumption is predicted to be as volatile as output. When the model is aug-
mented to include volatility in political ideology then V ar(^ ct) > V ar(^ yt) as the covariance between
political and economic shocks is positive (as long as p > 0:5, which is the empirically relevant
domain for the probability of re-election). Also, the larger the degree of polarization the bigger the
second and third terms in equation (5).
An obvious question is whether the model can generate V ar(^ ct) < V ar(^ yt) under some speci-
cation. A partial answer can be found in panels B and D of Figure 4, where we depict the impulse
responses of our model under less than full depreciation, setting  = 0:1. While consumption still
increases more than output when there is a switch from L to R, its response to TFP shocks is much
smaller; a one percent change in output results in less than a one percent increase in consumption.
It is then reasonable to expect that, depending on the relative strength of these two shocks, we
could observe economies where V ar(^ ct) 7 V ar(^ yt). Whether the predictions of the model are con-
sistent with the stylized facts observed in the data is then a quantitative question. We address this
by analyzing a more general environment where some of the restrictive assumptions of this section
are relaxed.
Notice also from Figure 4 that the relative volatility of consumption will be decreasing as
aggregate volatility due to the TFP process increases. If emerging economies simply had more
volatile TFP processes while holding the political process constant; the eects of Panel D would
dominate the eects of Panel B, leading to less volatile consumption relative to income. It is not
enough in a standard RBC model to simply alter the productivity process because more volatility
due to politics is required to generate higher (c)=(y).
5 Quantitative Analysis
In this section we calibrate our benchmark model and test whether its quantitative implications are
in line with stylized facts from the US economy. We then analyze how some key moments change
as we modify the degree of political polarization using our empirical measure of this variable. In
14particular, our aim is to quantify how much of the dierence in the relative volatility of consump-
tion to output can be explained by the mechanisms outlined in previous sections. The numerical
procedure used to solve the model involves nding a xed point in equilibrium policy rules. Details
of this approach are described Appendix 7.4. Computation is non trivial because it is necessary to
guess four functions: the savings rules for individuals under a left and right government HL(z;k)
and HR(z;k), and the spending rules of each party GL(z;k) and GR(z;k). In addition, we need to
solve for the savings function under a one-period deviation H(z;k;g).
5.1 Calibration
Because we are building on the neoclassical framework, many of the parameters are standard. A
time period represents a year, so the discount factor is  = 0:95. The share of capital  is set to
0:36 and the depreciation rate  is 0:1. Preferences are logarithmic.
There are six parameters that still need to be determined. One of them sets adjustment costs,
. Two of them,  and vol(), govern the behavior of TFP shocks. The remaining three, p, , and
 , set the behavior of political shocks. They are selected in order to match six empirical moments,
which are computed using data for the US over the sample period 1960-2003. The model implied
moments are obtained by simulating the political equilibrium for 11,000 periods where the rst
1,000 are discarded to eliminate the eects of initial conditions. Table 2 summarizes the values of
the parameters obtained from the calibration along with the target moments.
Table 2: Calibrated parameters
U.S.
parameter parameter value target
 0.92 corr(yt;yt 1)= 0:53
vol() 1.86e-2 vol(y)=1.98e-2
 0.57 vol(I)=6.65e-2
p 0.9 ave. pol. tenure =10 yrs.
 1.38e-2 vol(g)= 2.47e-2
  0.37 mean(g=y)=0:24
Note: Cyclical moments computed by HP-ltering (w =
100) the natural logs variables over the sample 1960-2003.
I and y are obtained from Kaminsky, Reinhart and Vegh
(2004), and g is consolidated government expenditures net
of transfers, from NIPA Table 3.1 Government Current Re-
ceipts and Expenditures.
Productivity, specied as z0 = z + 0, is discretized using a two-state Markov process with
values chosen such that  delivers an output autocorrelation of 0:53 and the volatility of  implies
an output volatility of 1:98%. Adjustment costs  are chosen so that model generated investment
volatility is equal to the value observed in the US of 6:67%. The probability of re-election p generates
15an average tenure in power of 10 years, in line with political turnover in the US. The mean value
of i is chosen to match the average ratio of public spending to output, while  is set so that the
volatility of g obtained from the model is equal to the one observed in the US for the same time
period, 2:47%.
Table 3 reports the t of the model for a broader set of business cycle moments (those marked
with asterisks are matched as part of our calibration strategy). The rst thing to note is that
the introduction of political frictions to an otherwise standard neoclassical framework does not
undermine the t of the model to primary economic variables. For example, the cyclical behavior of
consumption and investment is remarkably close to its empirical counterpart, as seen by comparing
our predicted measures of (y;c) and (y;I) to the US values. Moreover, the correlation between
private consumption and investment is also close to the data. Even though it was not a target of
our calibration, the relative volatility of consumption to output (c)=(y), our main variable of
interest, is in line with the observed value for the US over the sample. The model under-predicts
the level of persistence in government expenditures, as well as its cyclicality. This is due to the fact
that public spending is more responsive to political swings than to TFP shocks in our model.














Given the success of the model in matching business cycle moments for key economic as well as
and political variables, we can now move toward computing the relative volatility of consumption
and public spending for the cross-section of countries in our sample.
5.2 Political business cycles
In this section we analyze the eects of political polarization on the cyclical components of con-
sumption c, investment I, output y, and public spending g. In the rst exercise we abstract from
other forms of heterogeneity across countries. We then allow dierent income processes for emerg-
ing and developed countries. Finally, we allow stability p to vary across countries, calibrating it to
16a political stability data set.
5.2.1 Heterogeneity in polarization
In order to isolate political factors from productivity dierences across countries, which have been
studied at length in previous literature, we x all parameters to the calibrated levels of our bench-
mark economy except for one: polarization. Therefore, our main experiment consists of allowing j
to vary across countries. Recall that a type R agent living in country j has preferences that satisfy
(1   Rj)u(c) + Rjv(g); with Rj =     j:
Changes in j across countries imply dierences in their degree of polarization. The mapping
between the empirical measure of polarization and j is inferred from two points: US and Mex,
each chosen to match the implied relative volatility of public spending (g)=(y) with its data
counterpart for the US and Mexico.7
These two countries were chosen as representatives for developed and emerging economies. We
then impute j from the following linear relationship




where Pj denotes country j's value of polarization from the Lindqvist and  Ostling (2007) dataset.
After inferring j, we re-compute and simulate the political equilibrium for each country in our
sample (see Table 7 in Appendix 7.1 for the list of countries). The relative volatility of consumption
to output for dierent polarization values implied by our model can be contrasted to the actual
data in Figure 5.
Other than for Norway and Pakistan, our model resembles the bulk of the observations. We
can quantify the t as follows
F = 1  
35 X
j=1





where ^  denotes volatility predicted by the model and j the country observation. When all the
countries in our sample are included, F = 0:13. If the two outliers (Norway and Pakistan) are
excluded, F increases to 0:25. We take this as evidence that our theory complements existing
ones in the literature, since the model is able to explain up to 25% of the variability in relative
consumption volatilities across countries.
The dotted line in Figure 5 is the value of the relative volatility of consumption that would
be obtained in an environment that abstracts from political shocks. Because we are assuming all
parameters but j to be identical, the line is 
at. Moreover, (c)=(y) is smaller than one, as
7Data on g for Mexico are obtained from the Mexican Central Bank, Table `Gastos Presupuestales del Sector
Publico'. We construct g to be consistent with the US measure by subtracting Transfers from Total Expenditures for
the consolidated government. The sample period is also 1960-2003. To compute the volatility, we take the logarithm
of g and HP lter it with w = 100.
17Figure 5: Relative volatility of consumption and polarization.
observed in developed economies, but is at odds with emerging economies' values. The intuition|
closely linked to the one developed in Section 4.2|can be understood by comparing the responses
of consumption and output to political versus TFP shocks, depicted in Figure 6. In both cases, the
shocks last for 10 periods, the average tenure in power of a political party. Consumption responds
slightly less than output to a TFP shock, as shown in the right panel. The volatilities for y and c
are thus almost identical in the simulated model.
Figure 6: Response to 10-period political and TFP shocks.
18The left panel of Figure 6 also makes it clear why (c)=(y) is bigger in emerging economies.
The response of consumption is not only larger than that of output when there is a switch in
political ideology, but the dierence between them is wider in countries with bigger j. Because
the degree of polarization is larger in emerging economies, policy swings resulting from changes in
government type are more pronounced. This creates higher relative consumption volatility than
the one observed in less polarized societies.
A summary of the average value of business cycle moments for developed and for emerging
economies is contained in Table 4. The model does a good job of predicting the average moments
in developed countries. The average relative volatility of consumption for these economies predicted
by our model ((c)=(y) = 0:97) is even closer to the empirical measure than the one reported in
Table 3. Recall that we calibrated the model to the US economy and only varied polarization across
countries.
Table 4: Business cycle models: data and model t
Developed Economies Emerging Economies
Moment Data Model1 Data Model1
(y) 2.37e-2 2.00e-2 4.28e-2 2.08e-2
(c)=(y) 0.96 0.97 1.23 1.11
(I)=(y) 3.79 3.56 3.85 4.87
(gc)=(y) 1.41 1.53 3.03 2.74
(y) 0.61 0.54 0.56 0.56
(gc) 0.60 0.44 0.38 0.41
(y;c) 0.80 0.97 0.71 0.86
(y;I) 0.85 0.82 0.62 0.49
(y;gc) 0.24 0.06 0.22 0.07
Consistent with the data, our model predicts a signicantly larger value for (c)=(y) in emerg-
ing economies (1.11 versus 0.97 in developed ones). This excess volatility is consistent with the
optimal behavior of consumers that react to government policy. In contrast to previous work, we
do not need to make additional assumptions regarding dierences in the nature of the underlying
income process to generate this fact.
5.2.2 Heterogeneity in the TFP process
Table 4 reveals that the model under-predicts the volatility of output for emerging economies
and over-predicts their variability of investment. The reason is that the volatility of output is
twice the value in developed countries and the process is less persistent. Here we re-calibrate the
income process for Mexico, which we take as a representative emerging economy, and then re-
compute moments for all other countries by only changing their degree of polarization. The t for
the Mexican economy can be found in the second column of Table 5, while the resulting average
business cycle moments for emerging countries is shown in the last column.
19Re-calibrating the TFP shocks and persistence to match Mexico's income process improves
the t of the model regarding the volatility of output (see second column of Table 5) but hardly
changes investment volatility (which is probably more related to adjustment costs being dierent
in emerging versus developed economies).
Table 5: Re-calibrating the TFP process
Mexico Emerging Economies
Moment Data Model2 Data Model2
(y) 3.57e-2 3.57e-2 4.28e-2 3.52e-2
(c)=(y) 1.16 1.12 1.23 1.08
(I)=(y) 2.80 5.49 3.85 4.56
(gc)=(y) 2.82 3.35 3.03 2.97
(y) 0.62 0.55 0.56 0.55
(gc) 0.40 0.26 0.38 0.40
(y;c) 0.81 0.81 0.71 0.83
(y;I) 0.76 0.49 0.62 0.48
(y;gc) 0.27 0.09 0.22 0.09
* calibrated moments.
The average relative volatility of consumption for emerging economies is 1.08, slightly lower
than the value 1.11 obtained in our benchmark model, while the other moments remain basically
unchanged.
5.2.3 Heterogeneity in political turnover
In this section we use data on government stability to construct a series of the probability of
re-election for each country pj, allowing for heterogeneity in political turnover in addition to po-
larization and productivity dierences. The data for political stability come from values assigned
by the Political Risk Services Group's (PRS) International Country Risk Guide. The data set is
described in Appendix 7.1, while the values for government stability are reported in the last col-
umn of Table 8 in the Appendix. The re-election probability pj is constructed by xing the U.S.






In this model emerging countries are assumed to have a TFP process and polarization calibrated
in the same manner as Model 2 with the addition of a dierent benchmark re-election probability.
Developed countries have the TFP and polarization values of Model 1.
The results are summarized in Table 6, where Model 3 refers to the averages of values predicted
by the model. In general the t improves for most of the business cycle moments. In particular,
the cyclicality of public spending is much closer to the data for both emerging and developed
20economies. This results from lower re-election probabilities: While developed countries tend to
have more stable governments (mean(pDeveloped) = 0:85 and mean(pEmerging) = 0:75), both are less
stable than the U.S. benchmark.
Table 6: Re-calibrating the political turnover
Developed Economies Emerging Economies
Moment Data Model3 Data Model3
(y) 2.37e-2 2.00e-2 4.28e-2 3.55e-2
(c)=(y) 0.96 0.97 1.23 1.06
(I)=(y) 3.79 3.71 3.85 4.66
(gc)=(y) 1.41 1.67 3.03 2.48
(y) 0.61 0.51 0.56 0.49
(gc) 0.60 0.36 0.38 0.22
(y;c) 0.80 0.91 0.71 0.87
(y;I) 0.85 0.78 0.62 0.62
(y;gc) 0.24 0.12 0.22 0.24
More frequent turnover increases the importance of political shocks in determining aggregate
volatility, which in turn increases both the relative volatility of consumption and government expen-
diture. Countries with lower stability should exhibit higher relative consumption volatility. This
eect is tempered, however, for emerging economies by the calibration strategy: Calibrating to a
lower p increases the volatility of public expenditure; therefore, Model 3 has lower levels of  for
emerging economies. The cyclicality of public spending increases to levels more in line with data
observation in Model 3; however, this is due largely to the ltering methodology. As p decreases,
the eects of political shocks come closer to standard annual business-cycle frequencies isolated by
the lter.
Quantitatively, the eect of including stability in the analysis is small. Graphically, this can
be seen in Figure 7. Developed countries do not exhibit high enough levels of heterogeneity in
government stability to make much of a dierence. For emerging economies however there is
a positive correlation between government stability and observed relative consumption volatility,
which is also suggested by the model. This oers only a small improvement in t however. The
values for model t remain essentially unchanged at F = 0:14 for all countries and F = 0:27 when
removing the two outliers.
5.3 Ineciencies
In this section, we analyze the welfare costs associated with the political process. To do this, we
compute the fraction of private consumption agents would collectively forego to replace the political
system with a benevolent planner who puts equal weight on each type. Its objective is given by
0:5[(1   L)u(c) + Lv(g)] + 0:5[(1   R)u(c) + Rv(g)]  (1    )u(c) +  v(g):























Figure 7: Relative volatility of consumption, polarization, and political turnover.
We assume that the planner is subject to the same frictions as any incumbent party: (i) lack of
commitment, (ii) distortionary taxation, and (iii) incomplete markets to face productivity shocks.
The main dierence is that the planner does not suer from political instability. The objective
is thus to isolate the eects of political shocks on welfare from those implied by the other three
frictions.
Dene the functions CPol, GPol as equilibrium consumption and government expenditure with
politics for a xed level of polarization and CBP, GBP as the equilibrium policies for a benevolent




t[(1    )u((1 + )C(st)Pol) +  v(G(st)Pol)] = Est
1 X
t=0
t[(1    )u(C(st)BP) +  v(G(st)BP)]:
where st is the state triplet (i;z;k) that evolves according to equilibrium policy H and the transition
processes for parties and productivity. The distribution of s0 is the invariant distribution of capital,
party in power and productivity given equilibrium policy.8
The rst line in Figure 8 represents the baseline scenario of xing all parameters to the U.S.
benchmark and adjusting polarization. Welfare costs are increasing in polarization because con-
sumption volatility induced by political turnover is larger as polarization rises. For the second line
the model is calibrated to the emerging economies' income and political process, which have more
8We run 1,000 simulations of the political equilibrium for 6,000 periods each. Then, we compute the discounted
utility of each agent after dropping the rst 5,000 periods in order to eliminate the eect of initial conditions. This
approximates the expected value function of agent type i in country j. We then add the expected values for L and R
in order to obtain aggregate welfare in the political equilibrium. We perform the same exercise, assuming that policy
is determined by a benevolent planner, then add an increasing fraction of private consumption to the model with
politics until the agent is indierent between the two. The gure shows the welfare cost in consumption for dierent
values of polarization.










Welfare Cost of Politics for Model 1
Welfare Cost of Politics for Model 3
Mexico
U.S.
Figure 8: Welfare gains as a function of polarization.
volatile productivity and a lower re-election probability. Costs are lower because reducing polariza-
tion has less of an eect in reducing consumption volatility. For the U.S. case, the representative
individual would be willing to sacrice no more than 0:3% of consumption to remove politics, while
for the Mexico case the fraction is much higher at 1:23% at the emerging economy benchmark.
6 Conclusion and Extensions
We presented a model where political parties that disagree on the size of the government alternate
in power. This introduces an additional source of volatility for economic variables, triggered by
changes in government policy that can be interpreted as political shocks. We showed that a standard
RBC model where only transitory productivity shocks are present cannot explain the consumption
volatility puzzle. However, when political shocks in the form of ideological switches are incorporated
(in addition to TFP shocks), the relative volatility of consumption gets closer to what is observed in
the data. We simulated the model and found that political polarization explains up to 27% of the
variation in the relative volatility of consumption across countries. This theory thus complements
existing explanations for the puzzle found in the literature.
There are three interesting extensions to the model that are beyond the scope of this paper
but will complement the analysis. The rst one is introducing a distinction between dierent types
of public expenditures. By adding transfers in addition to government consumption, it would be
possible to generate the mild counter cyclicality of expenditures observed in many developed coun-
tries. The second extension would consider the eect of political shocks in small open economies.
On the one hand, the access to international capital markets may dampen the eects of political
shocks. On the other hand, however, this could result in government policy that responds even
more to ideology switches. The nal eect on the relative volatility of consumption is thus unclear.
23The nal extension would analyze the political equilibrium where the government is not subject to
a balanced budget. This would allow parties to smooth productivity shocks, which could reduce
swings in taxes relative to our benchmark model. But it would also introduce a new channel for
manipulation, which can aect the cyclicality of decits in non trivial ways.
7 Appendix
7.1 Data
The data are obtained from Kaminsky, Reinhart, and V egh (2004), who compiled a comprehensive
cross-country panel for our main variables of interest from the IMF World Economic outlook (WEO)
and IMF Government Financial Statistics (GFS) data sets. Output y is `gross domestic product'.
Consumption c is `private consumption', which combines household consumption and non prot
institutions. Investment I is `national gross xed capital formation'. Public consumption gc is
`consolidated general government consumption'. The series are de
ated using the GDP de
ator.
We compute business cycle moments (volatilities, autocorrelations and correlations) on HP ltered
(with parameter 100) natural logs of each GDP de
ated variable, on the available time series for
each country.
`Political Polarization" is based on interviews with respondents in 81 countries, compiled at
the World Values Survey (Lindqvist and  Ostling, 2010). We use answers to the following question:
`How would you place your views on this scale?'where 1 means agree completely with the left
(people should take more responsibility to provide for themselves) and 10 means agree completely
with the right (the government should take more responsibility). Our measure of polarization is
the standard deviation of responses per country.
`Political Stability" is obtained from Political Risk Services' (PRS) International Country Risk
Guide data set, and the variable name is Government Stability'. We use the 1980-1990s average
for this variable. Countries are assigned `government stability'points based on an assessment of the
government's ability to carry out its declared programs as well as its ability to stay in oce using
PRS' proprietary methodology.
Since data availability is not consistent across the four economic variables for individual coun-
tries, the period studied in each case re
ects the longest time span for which we have complete
data for that country. Sample lengths for each country are reported in Table 7. We also dropped
from the sample countries for which we had no Polarization data.
7.2 Proof of Proposition 4.1













; y = rk + w:
24Table 7: Sample lengths
Developed Economies Emerging Economies
Country Period Country Period
Australia 1960-2003 Algeria 1969-2003
Austria 1965-2003 Bangladesh 1969-2003
Canada 1960-2003 Brazil 1977-2003
Finland 1965-2003 Chile 1966-2003
France 1970-2003 China 1981-2003
Germany 1979-2003 Dominican Republic 1969-2003
Ireland 1960-2003 Egypt 1969-2003
Italy 1965-2003 Indonesia 1969-2003
Japan 1960-2003 Iran 1969-2003
Netherlands 1960-2003 Jordan 1963-2003
New Zealand 1969-2003 Korea 1960-2003
Norway 1969-2003 Mexico 1969-2003
Portugal 1969-2003 Morocco 1969-2003
Spain 1969-2003 Pakistan 1963-2003
Switzerland 1969-2003 Peru 1969-2003
United Kingdom 1960-2003 Philippines 1969-2003
United States 1960-2003 South Africa 1966-2003
Uganda 1982-2003
Zimbabwe 1969-2003
25Table 8: Relative volatility of consumption, investment and public spending
Country (c)=(y) (I)=(y) (gc)=(y) Polarization Stability
Developed Economies:
Australia 0.68 3.78 1.35 2.29 8.27
Austria 0.85 3.60 1.32 2.10 8.43
Canada 0.85 4.03 1.47 2.21 8.12
Finland 0.68 3.83 0.76 2.09 8.90
France 0.73 4.51 0.91 2.22 8.06
Germany 1.19 2.33 1.33 2.28 8.03
Ireland 1.11 4.10 1.58 2.28 8.88
Italy 0.96 3.58 1.96 2.21 7.15
Japan 0.56 2.69 2.01 1.85 8.06
Netherlands 1.23 3.64 1.58 1.86 8.62
New Zealand 1.20 3.75 1.73 2.27 7.88
Norway 1.81 4.8 1.58 1.91 8.04
Portugal 0.95 4.60 1.68 2.73 8.03
Spain 1.02 3.35 1.03 2.49 8.27
Switzerland 0.55 4.13 1.06 2.38 9.75
United Kingdom 1.15 4.39 1.37 2.19 8.26
United States 0.83 3.35 1.21 2.24 8.83
Mean 0.96 3.79 1.41 2.21 8.33
Emerging Economies
Algeria 1.95 3.14 1.46 3.19 8.07
Bangladesh 1.03 1.53 3.60 3.35 5.88
Brazil 1.12 3.32 2.49 3.20
Chile 1.20 5.85 1.99 2.80 7.30
China 1.22 2.29 1.19 2.87 8.38
Dominican Republic 1.31 3.39 7.51 3.17 6.76
Egypt 1.28 4.50 2.71 2.87 8.25
Indonesia 0.96 3.99 6.0 2.64 7.39
Iran 1.02 2.74 1.71 2.62 7.22
Jordan 1.16 2.60 4.19 2.95 8.16
Korea 1.00 4.18 2.28 2.39 7.70
Mexico 1.16 2.80 2.82 3.31 7.44
Morocco 1.04 3.98 2.40 3.51 8.77
Pakistan 1.53 4.08 2.64 1.65 7.20
Peru 0.91 3.11 2.74 2.86 6.06
Philippines 0.66 4.14 2.80 2.68 6.44
South Africa 1.93 5.03 3.99 3.06 7.73
Uganda 1.52 4.09 2.95 3.02 7.50
Zimbabwe 1.31 8.30 2.14 3.43 6.13
Mean 1.23 3.85 3.03 2.92 7.39
Note: Cyclical moments (autocorrelations and volatilities) are computed by HP-ltering (w = 100) the natural logarithms
of variables over the sample period 1960-2003 of data obtained from Kaminsky, Reinhart, and V egh (2004). Polarization
is computed in Lindqvist and  Ostling (2010). Political Stability comes from Political Risk Services (PRS) government
stability indicator.











Simple inspection reveals s = 1   . Since g = y, substitution of s and  give
c = (1   )(y   g); (6)
k0 = (y   g): (7)
Given agent optimization, the current government's problem is
max
gi
(1   i)ln(c) + iln(g) + Ez[pVi(z0;k0) + (1   p)Wi(z0;k0)]
subject to (9), (10). Here the expectation is taken only over the realization of the TFP shock z.
Vi and Wi are dened as in the text, they are the equilibrium continuation values of remaining
in power and losing power, respectively, for a given party of type i. The government's rst order








k;i + (1   p)W0
k;i]: (8)
The equilibrium continuation values use equilibrium policy for gi. Assume (as is later conrmed)
















We use the government's FOC (government optimality must hold in equilibrium) to eliminate the
Ez[pV 0
k;i + (1   p)W0













The derivative of W is slightly more complex because the government's FOC cannot be used to
















where gj = j is the policy of the opposing party j. We know the value of Ez[Vk;i]0 and we can























































We have a closed form expression for k0 when party j is in power, k0 = (1 j)y. Inserting this















Just like Vk;i this can be updated by simply replacing k with k0; no expectation operator is necessary.



























Notice here everything cancels except the primitives , , and p. After some more brief algebra we
arrive at
 =
1   2p   22(1   2p)
1   (1   2p)
:
7.3 Proof of Proposition 4.2
Dening ^ ct = ln(ct) and ^ yt = ln(yt) we want to show that in this environment V ar(^ ct) > V ar(^ yt).
We know from above that
ct = (1   )(1   t)yt; (9)
kt+1 = (1   t)yt (10)
where t is the realization of the political shock in period t. Taking logs of equation (9) gives
ln(ct) = ln(1   ) + ln(1   t) + ln(yt);
^ ct = ln(1   ) + ^ xt + ^ yt:
with ^ xt = ln(1   t). Then
V ar(^ ct) = V ar(^ yt) + V ar(^ xt) + 2Cov(^ xt; ^ yt): (11)
28Using (10) and initial production y0, ^ yt can be written as
^ yt = ln(zt) + t^ y0 +
t X
k=1
kln(zt k) + kln() + k^ xt k:
Using this expression it is apparent that
Cov(^ xt; ^ yt) =
t X
k=1
kCov(^ xt; ^ xt k):
Now using
Cov(^ xt; ^ xt k) = E[^ xt^ xt k]   E[^ xt)E(^ xt k[
and a symmetric two-state process for  (which implies ^ xt 2 f^ xH; ^ xLg) we know the unconditional
expectation for ^ xt is
E[^ xt] = E[^ xt k] = 0:5^ xL + 0:5^ xH:
The joint expectation depends on the path from t   k to t.





Prob(^ xt k = ^ xj)Prob(^ xt = ^ xij^ xt k = ^ xj)^ xj^ xi:
Dening P as the transition matrix for ^ x, this expression becomes






i;j ^ xj^ xi:
Where Pk
i;j is the fi;jg element of the transition matrix to the kth power. With re-election proba-
bility p the transition matrix9
P =

p 1   p






1 + (2p   1)k 1   (2p   1)k




E[^ xt^ xt k] = 0:5(^ x2
H + ^ x2
L)0:5[1 + (2p   1)k]   ^ xH^ xL[(1   (2p   1)k]0:5
Rearranging terms
Cov(^ xt; ^ xt k) = 0:52(2p   1)k(^ xH   ^ xL)2
So we can rewrite (11) as
V ar(^ ct) = V ar(^ yt) + V ar(^ xt) + 2
t X
k=1
k0:52(2p   1)k(^ xH   ^ xL)2:
9From Hamilton, J.D., 1994, Time Series Analysis, Princeton University Press.
297.4 Algorithm
The numerical implementation consists of nding a xed-point in the two equilibrium policy rules:
Gi(z;k) and Hi(z;k). Because of asymmetric preferences, stochastic productivity, and the impor-
tance of the transitional dynamics in determining the simulated moments of the model, it is not
enough to solve at steady states as in Klein, Krusell and Rios-Rull (2008). We require a global
solution for the equilibrium rules. To accomplish this we make guesses at these rules and iterate on
them using the agents' and government's rst order conditions until convergence. The algorithm
proceeds as follows:
1. Start with a suciently large grid for k and g.
2. Make \good" guesses for the functions GN
i (z;k) and HN
i (z;k) for each of the points on the
grid of k, the realization of the shock z, and the party in power i. We use cubic spline
interpolation to determine policy for o-grid values of k and also the derivatives of the policy
functions that appear in the government's optimality condition.
3. Using these guesses and the current state solve the agent's Euler equation for k0 at each state,
fk;z;ig as well as the level of g. This gives the function Hi(z;k;g) = k0.
4. The government takes agent optimization Hi in the current period as given. The next step
is to solve the government's rst order condition for g given future policy GN and HN and
current agent optimization Hi. The solution to this problem gives the updated guess for g
policy, GN+1
i (z;k) = g.
5. Update the guess at equilibrium savings policy: HN+1
i (z;k) = Hi(z;k;GN+1
i (z;k)).
6. Repeat this process until maxfjGN+1
i (z;k)   GN
i (z;k)j;jHN+1
i (z;k)   HN
i (z;k)jg is small
enough.
Time-consistency introduces particular challenges to computation of the equilibrium. The gov-
ernment's problem is not in general a contraction and has signicant non convexities. To overcome
the lack of contraction in a similar framework, Ilzetzki (2010) solves the nite horizon problem for a
long horizon. We do not need to resort to this; in practice our program converges relatively quickly
given our \good" initial guesses.
The advantage we have in solving the problem is the \good" initial guess of having a closed
form solution given Assumption 1. Starting with an exact solution for the policy functions, the
parameters can be slowly adjusted to the desired calibration. This adjustment is done at times
extremely slowly to maintain a contraction in the government's problem. For a grid of 60 points
for k and 30 points for g we consistently achieve convergence of 1e-7.
30References
[1] Aguiar, M. and Amador, M. (2010). \Growth in the shadow of expropriation," Quarterly
Journal of Economics, forthcoming.
[2] Aguiar, M. and Gopinath, G. (2007). \Emerging market business cycles: The cycle is the
trend," Journal of Political Economy, 115, 69-102.
[3] Alesina, A. (1987). \Macroeconomic policy in a two-party system as a repeated game,"
Quarterly Journal of Economics, 102:3, 651-78.
[4] Alesina, A. and Roubini, N. (1997). Political cycles and the macroeconomy. MIT. USA.
[5] Alesina, A. and Tabellini, G. (1990). \A positive theory of scal decits and government
debt," Review of Economic Studies, 57:3, 403-414.
[6] Alesina, A. and Zhuravskaya, E. (2008). \Segregation and the quality of government in
a cross-section of countries," NBER Working Paper No. 14316.
[7] Alt, J.E., and Dreyer Lassen, D. (2000). \Transparency, political polarization, and polit-
ical budget cycles in OECD countries," American Journal of Political Science, 50(3) 530-550.
[8] Amador, M. (2008). \A political model of sovereign debt repayment," mimeo.
[9] Azzimonti, M. (2010). \Barriers to investment in polarized societies," American Economic
Review, forthcoming.
[10] Bachman, R. and Bai, J. (2010) \Government purchases over the business cycle: the role
of economic and political Inequality," NBER Working Paper No. 16247.
[11] Barseghyan, L., Battaglini, M., and Coate, S. (2010). \Fiscal Policy over the real
business cycle: A positive theory," mimeo.
[12] Baxter M., and King, R (1993). \Fiscal policy in general equilibrium," American Economic
Review, 83, 315-334.
[13] Besley, T. and Coate, S. (1998). \Sources of ineciency in a representative democracy: A
dynamic analysis," American Economic Review, 88:1, 139-156.
[14] Caballero, Ricardo and Pierre Yared (2008). \Future rent-seeking and current public
savings," NBER Working Paper No. 14417.
[15] Cukierman, A., Edwards, S. and Tabellini, G. (1992). \Seigniorage and political insta-
bility," American Economic Review, 82:3, 537-55.
[16] Devereux, M. and Wen, J.F. (1998). \Political instability, capital taxation and growth,"
European Economic Review, 42:9, 1635-1651.
31[17] Dotsey, M. (1990). \The economic eects of production taxes in a stochastic growth model,"
American Economic Review, Vol. 80:5, 1168-1182.
[18] Drazen, A. (2000). Political Economy in Macroeconomics. Princeton Univesity Press, Prince-
ton, New Jersey.
[19] Easterly, William and Ross Levine (1997). \Africa's growth tragedy: policies and ethnic
divisions," Quarterly Journal of Economics, 112(4), 1203-1250.
[20] Fat as, A. and Mihov, I. (2003). \The case for restricting scal policy discretion," Quarterly
Journal of Economics, 118, 4: 1419-1447.
[21] Fern andez-Villaverde, J., Guerr on, P., Rubio-Ram rez, J. and Uribe, M. (2009).
\Risk matters: The real eects of volatility shocks," NBER Working Paper No. 14875.
[22] Greenwood, J., Hercowitz, Z., and Krusell, P. (2000). \The role of investment-specic
technological change in the business cycle," European Economic Review, 44, 91-115.
[23] Ilzetzki, Ethan (2010) \Rent-seeking distortions and scal procyclicality," Journal of De-
velopment Economics, forthcoming.
[24] Ilzetzki, Ethan and Carlos V egh (2008) \Procyclical scal policy in developing countries:
Truth of ction," mimeo.
[25] Kaminsky, Graciela, Carmen Reinhart, and Carlos V egh (2004) \When it rains, it
pours: Procyclical capital 
ows and macroeconomic policies". NBER macroeconomics annual
2004, ed. Mark Gertler and Ken Rogo, 11-82. Cambridge,
[26] Klein, P., Krusell, P. and Rios-Rull, V. (2008). \Time-consistent public expenditures,"
Review of Economic Studies, 75:3, 789-808.
[27] Lane, P. (2003). \The cyclical behaviour of scal policy: Evidence from the OECD," Journal
of Public Economics Volume 87, 12: 2661-2675.
[28] Lindqvist, Erik and Paul Ostling (2010), \Political polarization and economic perfor-
mance," American Political Science Review, 104: 543-565
[29] Milesi-Ferretti, G. and Spolaore, E. (1994). \How cynical can an incumbent be? Strate-
gic policy in a model of government spending," Journal of Public Economics, 55:1, 121-140.
[30] Neumeyer, P. and Perri, F. (2005). \Business cycles in emerging economies: The role of
interest rates," Journal of Monetary Economics, 52:2, 345-380.
[31] Persson, T. and Svensson, L. (1989). \Why a stubborn conservative would run a decit:
Policy with time-inconsistent preferences," Quarterly Journal of Economics, 104:2, 325-345.
[32] Schmitt-Grohe, S. and Uribe, M. (2011). \Business cycles with a common trend in neutral
and investment-specic productivity," Review of Economic Dynamics, 14:1, 122-135.
32[33] Song, Zheng (2010) \Persistent ideology and the determination of public policy over time,"
International Economic Review, forthcoming.
[34] Woo, J. (2005). \Social polarization, scal instability and growth," European Economic Re-
view, 49:6, 1451-1477.
33